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Hamad: Myth & Manipulation

Myth & Manipulation
by Allison Hamad
(Anthropology 130)
The Assignment: Make two to three cogent and significant generalizations about trauma
and transcendence, focusing on 1.) the context (geography, history, culture, etc.), 2.) the
trauma itself, and 3.) the recovery process, using data from Cambodia, Bosnia, and Africa
(Sudan and/or Rwanda). Be sure to use specific supportive data from readings and films,
including information from Annhilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide.

C

ultures and cultural practices around the world are wonderfully diverse, but while religion is
different in various parts of the world, and while menus vary widely and ideas about family differ,
genocides look strikingly similar wherever they occur. Genocide occurs around the globe to
people of all colors, faiths, and economic backgrounds. Many similarities can be seen in the genocides
perpetrated in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Sudan. Two factors that are of particular
significance are that each of the genocides was fueled by official myths that contradicted the realities on
the ground, and that each of the tragedies required the separation of families in order to destabilize the
groups against which the genocide was being perpetrated.
Behind most genocide is the other-creating myth: ideas that separate one group from another,
demonizing the “other” and inciting violence. These myths are not based on reality; on the contrary,
these myths often present a picture so different from the reality that the people know and experience that
they do not readily accept them. Such was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Underlying the Balkan
conflict was the Serbian claim that Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims could not live together. Radovan
Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb nationalist leader, proclaimed, “We cannot live with the Muslims and the
Croats, for there is too much hatred, centuries old hatred” (Bringa 197). Yet while Karadzic insisted on
the impossibility of living together, Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats were living together peacefully
as neighbors and as friends.
This is well illustrated in the film We Are All Neighbors. The film follows families in a Bosnian
village just outside of Sarajevo near Kiseljak; a village that is both Croat and Muslim. The relationships
between the families in the film are amiable and pleasant. Before the violence reached their village, there
was no emphasis on ethnic or religious differences. The people of the village viewed themselves as
Bosnian rather than Croat or Muslim. The neighbors visited each other, exchanged gossip, and lived their
lives in relative harmony. This was the reality prior to the violence. Even when the talk of nationalism
and ethnic division reached the village, the residents found it ridiculous, insisting that division would not
be realized in their village. “We will always have coffee,” one Muslim woman said of her lifelong Croat
friend.
The people who lived together as neighbors in Bosnia would not accept the idea of separation
until violence touched their village. It was then that they retreated to the ethnic boundary lines that had
previously been no more than propaganda. Friendships dissolved and trust disappeared, not because of
“centuries old hatred” but because of an official myth and the violence that accompanied.
A similar situation of co-existence was present in Rwanda. Though the Hutu and Tutsi are from
different tribes, prior to the genocide in Rwanda, the people lived together and intermarried. In order to
bring about the right climate for violence against the Tutsi, Hutu extremists circulated what Liisa Malkki
called “mythico-histories”: tales of the foreignness, the laziness, and the deceptiveness of the Tutsi
(Taylor 140). As in Bosnia, these myths contradicted what most people experienced in their daily lives,
but the persistence of the extremists, along with the circumstances surrounding the death of Rwandan
President Habyarimana, led to the acceptance of the myths and the horrible brutality that ensued.
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The official myth took a more direct approach in the Darfur region of Sudan. In order to avoid
direct conflict, ruling parties have often followed the mantra “divide and conquer”. The government of
Khartoum did precisely this when the Sudanese Minister of the Interior, Abdel Rahim Muhammed
Hussein, announced to the media that the Massaliet, a non-Arab tribe in the region, had slaughtered all of
the Arab Omdas of Darfur (Yahiya). This official myth was all that was necessary to incite Arab tribes in
the region to attempt to obliterate the Masseliet.
In Democratic Kampuchea, the myths did not attempt to create divisions between ethnic groups
so much as they sought to cloak the horror of the reality of life under the Khmer Rouge with a
frighteningly delusional idealism. In her article “Dance, Music, and the Nature of Terror in Democratic
Kampuchea”, Toni Shapiro-Phim refers to the Khmer Rouge and their use of song as a means of instilling
beliefs in their utopian ideals. She cites, “the official voice can so strikingly contradict reality and by
means of such contradiction create fear” (183). Songs of the freedom and independence that the Angkar
brought to the Cambodian people were sung to those people that the Angkar had turned from free men
and women to slaves. Songs praising the ingenuity and luck of the Angkar in farming, touting the
abundance of the rice crop, were sung to those enslaved people who gave their blood to the ground in
order to harvest an insufficient crop. These blatant contradictions were a form of torture in themselves.
One might ask, however, even if these myths are accepted by the perpetrators, why the victims of
such atrocities do not rise up or protest? This is where the second factor that is common to these
genocides comes into play; the breaking up of the family unit weakens a group in such a devastating way
that it becomes intensely difficult to maintain a cohesive societal unit.
Because family is at the core of so many cultures, it is not difficult to assess the reason that the
break up of the family unit is detrimental. It is, however, helpful to consider the specific effects of
familial fracturing in each case. What is common to each case is that families were separated: husbands
from wives, children from parents. Whatever was the support network that functioned in the area to
maintain personal well-being and culture, it was disturbed.
In both Bosnia and Rwanda, for example, the prevalence of intermarriage between ethnic groups
became particularly problematic as the ethnic boundaries became more defined. If you could not identify
yourself wholly with one side or another, you were in dangerous territory. Even if someone of mixed
kinship were to choose one part of his or her ethnicity with which to identify, he or she might still be
viewed as “other”.
While the dilemma of families who spanned ethnic boundaries was significant, other problems
associated with family separation were much more widespread. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, men were taken
from the towns and villages and rounded up to be killed. The same thing happened in the Sudan. The
title of Loung Ung’s book, First They Killed My Father, reflects the fact that the Khmer Rouge also found
this tactic effective.
The removal of men from each society had devastating effects. The Nuba of central Sudan were
left with no one to tend their herds, which was traditionally the duty of the men. Cambodia suffered
tremendous difficulty because there were so many widows and so few adult men surviving after the fall of
the Pol Pot regime. According to the film Samsara, even now, nearly twenty-five years after the end of
the rule of the Khmer Rouge, it is difficult for Cambodian women to find husbands. There are still not
enough men.
As though it were not destructive enough to attempt to rid entire groups of their male populations,
the exploitation of children in these genocidal situations was also common. In Cambodia, the Khmer
Rouge sought to redefine the order of society by turning children into soldiers and giving them authority
over their elders. This reversal of roles began with the extermination of honorifics and proper names.
Everyone was to be referred to as “Met” (Ung 60). If there were no “sirs” or “madams” or “mas” or
“pas”, the Angkar believed that they could redefine roles in whatever way they saw fit. This had an
intensely detrimental effect on both the younger and older generations of Cambodians that lived through
that period.
The Khmer Rouge were not the only perpetrators of violence to exploit child labor; the “peace
camps” of Sudan were created, in part, to make pro-Arab Muslim soldiers of non-Arab, non-Muslim
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Sudanese children. If a family was fortunate enough to stay together before arrival, the first thing to
happen upon entering a peace camp would be separation. Once the families were separated, children
were shipped to other locations where they would be trained as soldiers (Burr). Not only is this type of
separation devastating for the individuals during the violence, but it also has long lasting destructive
effects on the cultures that it touches.
When families are separated, men are lost, and children are taken away, the struggle for the
survival of a culture becomes intensely difficult. There is always a chance that the culture will be lost, if
not completely, at least in spirit. The culture that existed, before the genocide might not ever be fully
recovered. The same difficulty arises from the power of the official myths. Though they did not reflect
an initial reality, overcoming them can prove difficult if they are widespread.
While both reality-challenging myths and family separations are common to the traumas of
Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Sudan, these themes can be the common points of
transcendence among them as well. Rebuilding families can be healing. Learning to trust is important to
recovery and starts with the family. Though official myths were used as weapons of mass devastation,
official truths could heal not only the victims of the violence, but the relationships that are necessary for
healthy coexistence. It remains to be seen whether post-genocide transcendence will prove itself as
universal as the trauma, but the possibilities are real.
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